dent power to order armies, as they marched into the rebellious
states, to liberate the slaves of rebels ? It is undoubtedly a
perfectly legitimate exercise of the war power, as we have al¬
ready shown. But it is said he undertook to liberate slaves
in large tracts of country, far beyond the immediate reach of
the army. He did undertake to do this, unless the parties
then in rebellion returned to their allegiance within a given
time. But does the fact that the slaves were not then imme¬
diately within the reach of his armies make any difference,
provided the power of the government ultimately reaches
them ? It seems to me the difference of time in perfecting
the liberation announced makes no difference in principle.
At all events there is no constitutional objection to the act.
There is no power that can reverse it but Congress; and,
so far as it is an act done, it is questionable whether Congress
has power over it.
The power of amnesty in the President, in case ef treason
is a direct constitutional grant, which all concede can not be
From the remarks made it must be apparent that, the move¬
ments of our armies to put down rebellion their interference
with local institutions, as a rightful effect of ivar, the offers
of amnesty as a preliminary to peace, aud the determining
when peace and order are so established that it is safe to
withdraw our armies, and trust to the efficiency of the civil
arm of government for the due exercise of its authority, are
all legitimate exercises of the powers of government. And
in the discharges of these powers it is but fair to presume the
President and representatives of the people will endeavor to
act for the best interests of the public.
TERMS OF PEACE.
I now propose to consider the question of terms of peace
wholly independent of any measures the government may have
taken in regard to it, and solely on what I conceive to be its
In doing this I set aside altogether any idea of peace in